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1. INTRODUCTION
Several principles might guide the determination of pay and serve as the 
basis for the reward system, but in the last decades we are witnessing an increase 
in the prevalence of different forms of variable pay due to their incentive effects 
(Park & Sturman, 2016). Unlike traditional pay plans that are based on the worth 
of the job performed and where employees saw their job and pay as an entitlement, 
variable pay or pay for performance compensation is based on the principle that 
employees should be rewarded, in part at least, according to their contribution 
to performance (Henderson, 2006). Such plans distinguish from traditional time-
based pay schemes in that sense that they incorporate individual, team, or organi-
zational performance criteria (Armstrong & Murlis, 2004; Milkovich, Newman & 
Gerhart, 2013). 
Variable compensation can be classiÞ ed along several dimensions. Besides 
the level at which performance is deÞ ned and measured (individual-group-organi-
zation), variable compensation plans can also be differentiated by the time frame 
associated with measuring and rewarding performance (short-term or long-term) 
or according to the type of reward (cash, equity, recognition) (Greene, 2011). The 
common features of these numerous forms of variable pay are that it is „pay at 
risk“ which is awarded for speciÞ c achievements so that it will not be paid unless 
targets are achieved (Armstrong & Murlis, 2004:278) and that its effectiveness 
depends upon employee risk-aversion (Cadsby, Song, Tapon, 2016).
Variable pay has been a common component of executive pay, sales personnel 
compensation, or compensation for some types of manual workers. However, the 
use of supplementary employee reward systems has increased across Europe in 
recent decades, both in terms of the number of companies using it and the number 
of employees covered (Eurofound, 2016). According to the European Company 
Survey, almost two-thirds of European establishments use at least one form of 
variable pay, although there are substantial differences between Member States 
(Eurofound, 2016). European Working Conditions Survey (EWCS, 2015) reveals 
that about one in four examined employees (27%) in the EU28 reported that their 
earnings included some form of variable pay (Eurofound, 2017). The same re-
search also conÞ rmed that establishments use variable pay only for a minority 
of employees rather than as a general practice covering all employees. The most 
common types of variable pay plans among employees are pay linked to indi-
vidual performance (received by 16% of examined employees) and proÞ t-sharing 
schemes (received by 13% of examined employees). 
Pay has a signiÞ cant inß uence on job attractiveness, and therefore, on attract-
ing potential employees (Cable & Judge, 1994). Additionally, it has been widely 
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acknowledged that some reward elements have higher motivation potential than 
others (Stajkovic & Luthans, 2001). Organizations should choose the compensa-
tion system that will allow them to achieve desired objectives. However, when 
designing compensation plans employee pay preferences must not be neglected. A 
reward system should be built on an understanding of employees’ reward prefer-
ences (Lawler 2000, Kurtulus, Kruse & Blasi, 2011). 
Previous research has conÞ rmed that variable pay aligns Þ rms’ and employ-
ees’ interests (e.g., Jensen & Murphy, 1990). However, the drawback is that most 
previous researches on pay preferences were conducted in the context of North 
American cultures (Tosi & Greckhamer, 2004) and its conclusions have been sim-
ply transferred to other national contexts (Mamman, 1997). The rationale for this 
research is the claim that extension and replication of pay preferences theory in 
other contextual environments are important to knowledge accumulation and fur-
ther theory development (Tsang 2002 after Chiang & Birtch, 2006). The starting 
point for this paper was the assumption that the implementation of variable pay 
depends upon numerous factors and that its attractiveness for employees should be 
examined within country-speciÞ c contexts (see Prince et al., 2016). 
There are several research questions to be addressed with this paper: (1) what 
are the perspectives of using variable pay in Croatia, (2) what is the practice of us-
ing variable pay in Croatia and (3) do employee preferences for variable pay and 
current compensation practices in Croatia converge?
2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
2.1. Employee preferences towards variable pay
Variable pay has been strongly proclaimed in compensation management as 
the most effective and equitable reward system to both employees and the organi-
zation (Mamman, 1997:33). It has been conÞ rmed that variable pay has positive 
effects on job satisfaction (e.g. Kruse, Freeman & Blasi, 2010; Green & Heywood, 
2008), productivity (Bucklin & Dickinson, 2001; Cadsby, Song & Tapon, 2007), 
level of output (Dohmen & Falk, 2011), as well as that some forms of variable 
pay reduce employee turnover (O’Halloran, 2011). Even though pay preferences 
may inß uence individual and organizational outcomes of pay systems (e.g. Cable 
& Judge, 1994) there has been a void in the research on pay preferences (Chiang 
& Birtch, 2006). Employee preferences for different participatory compensation 
programs have been only sporadically examined possibly due to the lack of ap-
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propriate data sets (Kurtulus, Kruse & Blasi, 2011). Furthermore, limited research 
on pay preferences focused on Þ xed versus variable pay in general and did not dis-
tinguish between the individual, group, or collective based variable bay, although 
employees’ preferences for variable pay can depend upon whether it is based on 
individual, team/group or company performance (LeBlanc & Mulvey, 1998). For 
example, individual-based variable pay might be preferred over group-based vari-
able pay (Keaveny, O’Neill & Inderrieden, 2013).
Economic theory predicts that employees will have more favorable attitudes 
towards variable pay schemes when they: i) have low levels of risk aversion (e.g. see 
Cadsby, Song & Tapon, 2007; Dohmen & Falk, 2011), ii) have greater control over 
the work process generating payouts (residual control), iii) trust their co-workers, 
so that the free-rider problem associated with group incentives can be overcome 
by a cooperative solution, and iv) trust their managers not to exploit information 
asymmetries when distributing Þ nancial payouts (Kurtulus, Kruse & Blasi, 2011). 
Additional predictors of attitudes towards variable pay include individual char-
acteristics (age, gender, individual’s competitiveness, and other personality traits, 
relative self-assessment, equity sensitivity, occupation/position, and level of edu-
cation) and work-related attitudes (organizational and occupational commitment, 
satisfaction with pay) (Parnell & Sullivan, 1992; Cable & Judge, 1994; Mamman, 
1997; Lee, Iijima & Reade, 2011; Dohmen & Falk, 2011; von Bonsdorff, 2011; 
Keaveny, O’Neill & Inderrieden, 2013). More precisely, employees who are young-
er, competitive, and committed to their occupation prefer variable pay. High per-
formers are attracted to variable pay systems and low performers are attracted 
to Þ xed pay systems (Dohmen & Falk, 2011). Also, women are less likely to se-
lect variable-pay schemes than men (Dohmen & Falk, 2011). Keaveny, O’Neill 
& Inderrieden (2013) suggest that preference for individual variable pay systems 
might be negatively inß uenced by company size but shows a positive relationship 
with job support or perceptions of work autonomy. 
 Value systems and national culture also act as an important determinant 
when examining individual pay preferences (Cable & Judge, 1994) and the over-
all motivation potential of variable pay (Money & Graham, 1999). In order to 
achieve the best results through the compensation system, companies should em-
ploy culturally congruent compensation techniques (Schuler & Rogovsky, 1998). 
In highly collectivistic cultures individual variable pay may act as a far lesser 
incentive than in individualistic countries (Schuler & Rogovsky, 1998; Money & 
Graham, 1999, Goktan & Saatçõo lu, 2011). Furthermore, collectivistic values are 
related to preference for seniority-based pay (Goktan & Saatçõo lu, 2011) whilst 
uncertainty avoidance values show a positive relationship with the preference for 
Þ xed pay. Still, there is some evidence that employees might show a preference for 
equity-based compensation over equality-based compensation (Long et al., 2012) 
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even in cultural contexts for which it is unexpected due to original cultural values 
(Muduli, 2011). 
Unionists also tend to be less supportive of variable pay (Gomez-Mejia & 
Balkin, 1992; Lawler, 2000). Brown (2001) claims that job security is positively as-
sociated with preference for variable pay. Studies that have investigated employee 
preferred criteria to determine pay differentials (e.g. Mamman, 1997; Dickinson, 
2006) conclude that individual performance is among the most popular criteria 
to determine variability in pay and that employees do accept performance as the 
basis for determining pay (Dickinson, 2006).   
Empirical research on pay preferences is often the result of laboratory experi-
ments, and as Mamman (1997) argues the Þ ndings of such studies are not gener-
alizable across cultures. Research conducted by Kurtulus, Kruse & Blasi (2011) 
on an international set of employees has shown that most workers desire between 
0 and 30 percent of their compensation to be comprised of variable pay, with an 
average preference for variable pay of 20 percent of compensation. Individual-
oriented success sharing plans are more popular than group-oriented success shar-
ing plans (Keaveny, O’Neill & Inderrieden, 2013). Evidence exists that merit pay 
is a poor motivator if the performance measures are somewhat unclear and the re-
wards for performance are relatively small (Lawler, 2000). Interestingly, research 
by Kurtulus, Kruse & Blasi (2011) shows that employees show a preference for 
stock and stock options over cash incentive plans. Lee, Iijima & Reade (2011) at 
the same time showed that even in the Japanese context with the dominant senior-
ity-based payment system, employees show preference for performance-based pay 
over seniority-based pay.
2.2. Performance-related pay in the Croatian context
Compensation practices in Croatia were traditionally limited to egalitarian 
pay structures with the pay system based on seniority. Such compensation sys-
tem was rather similar to other emerging market economies, where most of these 
countries traditionally based compensation on seniority, group membership, and 
equality concerns rather than performance (Giacobbe-Miller et al., 2003; Du & 
Nam Choi, 2010). However, since the 1990s Croatian companies have experienced 
a change in their compensation systems, where many companies implemented 
performance based pay, particularly at the individual employee level. This might 
be the consequence of the global Americanization (Kressler, 2003) or Ango-
Saxonisation (Poutsma, Ligthart & Schouteten, 2005) of reward systems since 
numerous countries recently withdrew from the traditional reward structures of 
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their countries and adopted the ‘Western world’ approach, namely compensation 
strategies based on the extensive usage of short and long-term incentive compen-
sation. Still, due to the collectivistic national culture in Croatia (Hofstede, 1980), 
it is unclear whether such compensation systems can result in expected outcomes. 
Croatia is traditionally classiÞ ed among states with less prevalent variable 
payment systems. According to the comparative European Company Survey (ECS, 
2013), the most common form of variable payment in Croatia is pay linked to the 
individual performance of workers after management appraisal (40% of compa-
nies in Croatia, EU28 average 48%), followed by payment by results (28% of com-
panies in Croatia, EU28 average 34%), pay linked to group performance (20% of 
companies in Croatia, EU28 average 25%) and proÞ t-sharing (19% of companies 
in Croatia, EU28 average 30%). Shared ownership schemes are available in just 
5% of European establishments and 3% of Croatian companies (Eurofound, 2016). 
Earlier researches based on comparative methodology conÞ rm the Þ nding that 
Croatian companies use individual variable pay at lower rates than other EU coun-
tries, especially when compared to more developed countries (e.g. see Na inovi , 
Klindži  & Mari , 2012). 
With respect to the collectivistic national culture dominating in Croatia, one 
of the Þ rst studies of group-based incentives in Croatia, based on 1998 data, re-
vealed that 18.1% of surveyed organizations used proÞ t sharing and 6.6% used 
stock options (Galeti , Tipuri  & Juri, 2000 after Pološki Voki , Klindži  & 
Na inovi  Braje, 2016). Later research by Galeti  & Na inovi  (2006) indicated 
that 8.2% of sampled companies used proÞ t sharing, 16.7% used stock sharing and 
14.6% used stock options. Due to different datasets examined, the comparison of 
different researches on the incidence of such Þ nancial performance schemes in 
Croatia (see Pološki Voki , Klindži  & Na inovi  Braje, 2016) does not offer a 
deÞ nite conclusion on the most often used group-based scheme, however, in gen-
eral, such variable schemes are used less than individual performance-related pay. 
 3. METHODOLOGY OF RESEARCH
The large-scale research on perspectives and current status of reward man-
agement practices in Croatia was performed in two rounds: Þ rst, qualitative Delphi 
research followed by quantitative research. 
I. NAČINOVIĆ BRAJE: The perspectives of variable pay in Croatia: is there a gap between employee pay preferences...
EKONOMSKI PREGLED, 72 (4) 550-570 (2021)556
Qualitative research
The purpose of the qualitative research was not only to get a general over-
view of the reward management practices in Croatia but also to identify and dis-
cuss potential improvements that could be made to reward management practices 
to converge practices used with “best practices” available, especially those used by 
companies in other EU countries. Delphi study was used to reach some consensus 
about these open questions. The drive to undertake qualitative research was the 
necessity to understand the practice and to get an insight of knowledge of reward 
management from insiders’ (practitioners’) point of view. 
The Delphi technique uses knowledgeable experts that provide their opinions 
on topics from their area of expertise to a central coordinator. Structured or un-
structured questionnaires are sent to a panel of experts; the responses are collated 
and the original/revised questionnaire is then re-circulated, accompanied by an 
anonymized summary of responses (Mullen, 2003). The process occurs in several 
rounds until a consensus has been formed (Grisham, 2009). Since its initial use 
for technological forecasting in the 1950s, Delphi has been applied for many other 
purposes in social development, including health care, hospitality research, and 
research associated with human resource issues (Mullen, 2003; McGuire & Cseh, 
2006; Rupprecht et al., 2011; Paraskevas & Saunders, 2012). Delphi studies usually 
include three rounds of questionnaires (Powell, 2003) but the Þ nal decision about 
the number of rounds can be determined based on pragmatic reasons (Powell, 
2003, Paraskevas & Saunders, 2012). As Paraskevas & Saunders (2012) argue, one 
central question in the use of Delphi is the percentage of agreement a researcher 
should accept as synonymous with expert consensus. The practice shows that it can 
vary between predetermined explicit percentage cut-off points (e.g. 50-80% agree-
ment) to arbitrary cut-off points (Paraskevas & Saunders, 2012). 
  The purpose of this study was to determine the prospects of implementing 
variable pay in Croatian companies according to practitioners’ views. 
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Figure 1. 
TWO ROUNDS OF DELPHI RESEARCH
Participating experts’ group was based on a convenience sample. A total of 
13 participants, expert practitioners working in the Þ eld of reward management or 
general human resources, participated in Round 1 of Delphi research. They were 
employed by companies that varied in terms of sector, ownership structure, and 
unionization. The attrition rate between the two rounds was 15% (2 participants). 
All participants received an e-mail invitation to participate in the study which 
also contained an explanation of the Delphi process. A two-week time frame was 
assigned to each round of the research, with a reminder sent after the Þ rst week 
of each round. In the Þ rst stage, respondents were asked to respond to several 
research questions. The second stage of the research can be described as the nar-
rowing phase since respondents were asked to provide reasoning for broader issues 
identiÞ ed in phase one. Rating questions in study phase two were analyzed accord-
ing to descriptive statistics (mean and SD).
Quantitative research
The primary data was collected from companies that employ more than 100 
employees, with 61 companies in the study sample. The population for this re-
search was obtained through the Croatian Chamber of Commerce (CCC) where 
it was revealed that approximately 1700 companies in Croatia employ more than 
100 people, out of which 386 companies employ more than 250 people (labeled as 
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“large companies”). An e-mail with a cover letter from the principal investigator 
and a link to the online research questionnaire was sent to HR departments of all 
companies in the CCC database. The 46 questions questionnaire was developed 
to examine different pay modalities as well as various attitudes, behavior-based 
indicators, or organizational outcomes. A certain number of variables were treated 
as dummy variables (e.g. whether certain pay element existed in the organization 
or not), while the majority was of nominal and continuous character for which 
respondents were asked to make an assessment either on a Likert type scale or as 
closed-ended questions (ownership type, proÞ tability in the last three years and le-
gal form of the company). Several open-ended questions were present as well (e.g. 
year of establishment, industry, number of employees). The allotted time for Þ lling 
the questionnaire was approximately 30 to 45 minutes.
The independent characteristics of the companies in the sample are given in 
a summary table below (Table 1). The sample included more companies from the 
service sector (54.45%), established after 1990 (54.1%), organized as limited liabil-
ity companies (67.2%), and with a private domestic ownership majority (55.7%).
Table 1.
DATA DISTRIBUTION BY SAMPLE CHARACTERISTICS
Company characteristic Total sample (n=61)
Industry Manufacturing – 42.55%, Services – 54.45%
Year of establishment Before 1990 – 45.90%, After 1990 – 54.10%
Number of employees Less than 250 – 50.80%, More than 250 – 49.20%
Legal form Joint-stock company – 32.80%, Limited liability company 
– 67.20%
ProÞ tability in the last 5 
years
Cannot assess – 1.60%, UnproÞ table – 4.90%, Around or 
below average – 23.30%, ProÞ table – 70.50%
Ownership structure 
(majority)
Private domestic – 55.70%, Private foreign – 32.80%, 
State-owned and mixed – 11.50%
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4. RESEARCH RESULTS
4.1. Delphi study
The research questions of the Delphi study focus on experts’ opinions about 
different issues related to variable compensation. For this study, 80% agreement 
was used as a cut-off point for expert agreement.
R1Q1 What are employees’ attitudes towards variable pay?
Experts show signs of disagreement concerning employees’ attitudes on vari-
able pay and it was impossible to draw consensual opinion in round one. Some 
unconditionally claim that employees have a positive or negative view of variable 
compensation, but there are also some that claim that employees have a positive 
attitude towards variable pay only if certain conditions are met. Some of these 
conditions are that variable pay must be fairly distributed, based on predetermined 
criteria, clearly deÞ ned, and communicated. Experts also emphasized the impor-
tance of the amount of Þ xed pay relative to variable pay, claiming that the amount 
of Þ xed pay must be sufÞ cient. Those experts who claim that employees have a 
purely negative view of variable compensation explain it with the socialist heritage 
of equal pay, fear of failure, lack of knowledge or experience with variable pay.  
In general, experts’ responses indicate that in case companies in Croatia 
should opt for variable pay, they must be prepared that not all employees will have 
positive attitudes about it and accept it as a motivation technique. Respondents 
to the survey mentioned some obstacles that might inhibit the full potential of 
variable pay. This Þ nding is especially important for multinational companies op-
erating in Croatia since they will not be able to transfer reward systems to their 
subsidiaries in Croatia. 
R1Q2 What is the expected proportion of variable pay? 
Most experts acknowledge that the proportion of variable pay depends upon 
job position and type of industry. Still, most of them believe that, in general, 
around 10-30% of the total pay could be variable due to the point that employees in 
Croatia expect and appreciate safety. Such expectation is consistent with research 
on employee expectations on variable pay (e.g. Kurtulus, Kruse & Blasi, 2011). The 
exception to this expectation is the proportion of variable pay of sales personnel: 
experts expect that for these employees variable pay can account for up to 50% 
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of total pay. Another exception is the employee’s hierarchical position - human 
resource management experts believe that the proportion of variable pay should 
increase with the hierarchical position. However, several experts emphasized that 
employees in Croatia value safety, which is fully consistent with the features of na-
tional culture in Croatia (e.g. Hofstede, 1980). Consequently, it would be beneÞ cial 
for companies to have the amount of Þ xed pay large enough to leave employees 
with a feeling of security.    
R2Q1 Experts’ ratings of different aspects of variable compensation
Since the Þ rst round of Delphi research revealed that experts do not share a 
common view on variable compensation, round 2 of Delphi research tested differ-
ent features of variable compensation in Croatian companies. 
Concerning the general proportion of variable compensation that could be 
acceptable for employees, the proportion of 20-30% of variable pay was tested. 
Considering that 82% of examined experts agree, we Þ nd that a consensual opin-
ion has been reached: the acceptable proportion of variable pay should amount to 
up to 30% of total pay. However, experts did not reach a consensus on the propor-
tion of variable compensation in sales. Experts disagree with the claim that in sales 
variable pay should amount to 50% of total pay.
Experts are consensual that employees at lower hierarchical levels are more 
difÞ cult to accept variable pay but that they more easily accept variable pay in case 
they perceive that the performance appraisal system is fair. An additional feature 
that was tested in the context of acceptance of variable pay is the perception of the 
rater’s competence to perform the appraisal. However, results indicate that experts 
do not believe that this is among the crucial items that improve the acceptance of 
variable pay. Although round 1 of Delphi research revealed that the employee’s 
hierarchical position might inß uence its acceptance of variable pay, round 2 of 
the Delphi research showed that employees accept variable pay more easily in 
case they have higher base (Þ xed) salary. The Þ nal claim tested in Round 2 was 
the point that employees have a negative attitude towards variable pay because of 
fear of failure. However, research results indicate an absence of agreement on this 
issue. 
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Table 2. 
FEATURES OF VARIABLE COMPENSATION IN CROATIAN COMPANIES
Features of variable compensation % of agreement Average S.D. 
The acceptable proportion of variable pay for 
employees in Croatia amounts to 20-30% of total pay. 
82% 3.73 0.65
In sales, the preferred proportion of variable pay 
amounts to 50% of total pay.
54% 3.55 1.04
Employees at lower hierarchical levels are more 
difÞ cult to accept variable pay.  
100% 4.55 0.52
Employees accept variable pay more easily in case 
they have a higher base (Þ xed) salary.  
91% 4.27 0.65
Employees have a negative attitude towards variable 
pay because of fear of failure.
63% 3.64 0.81
Employees more easily accept variable pay in case 
they perceive the rater as competent.
82% 3.82 0.40
Employees more easily accept variable pay in case 
they perceive that the performance appraisal system 
is fair. 
100% 4.18 0.40
Based on the second round of the Delphi research, a general conclusion is 
that HR experts do not completely share their views on the amount of variable 
compensation that should be offered to employees or how to increase acceptance 
of variable pay. A possible reason for this is that the possibilities of implement-
ing variable pay in Croatia greatly differ depending upon the type of industry or 
company ownership. There is still a signiÞ cant number of companies in majority 
state ownership, most of them unionized, that do not apply variable compensation 
or intend to do so in the future. 
Additional rounds of Delphi research were not conducted since it was not 
foreseen that experts might reach a consensus due to conß icting expectations 
about variable pay. 
R1Q3 How to determine variable pay? 
Experts were asked to identify the most often used standards to determine 
performance and subsequently variable pay. There has been a consensual opin-
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ion on the most often used criteria: “quantity of output” and “fulÞ llment of tasks 
and objectives”. Besides these, participants in the Delphi survey identiÞ ed “quality 
of output” and “employee competencies” as important criteria when determining 
performance levels. Research output indicates that the preferred criteria for deter-
mining variable pay among Croatian companies include job-related features while 
the importance of employee’s personal traits was minorized.    
4.2. Quantitative research
 After examining the perspectives of variable pay based on experts’ opinions 
on the subject matter, the quantitative research examined current compensation 
practices in Croatian companies (n=61). The incidence of several forms of variable 
pay is shown in Table 3.
 
Table 3. 
THE USE OF DIFFERENT FORMS OF VARIABLE PAY AMONG 
DIFFERENT EMPLOYEE CATEGORIES
Type of incentive
% of companies applying for 
different categories of employees
% of companies 
applying for 





Norm measurement 4.9 4.9 11.5 11.5
Performance appraisal 54.1 54.1 55.7 73.8
Occasional bonuses based on 
superior’s evaluation
47.5 42.6 32.8 57.4
Sales commission 27.86 21.3 23.0 36.1
Goalsharing 23.0 24.6 23.0 31.1
Gainsharing 6.6 4.9 3.3 6.6
ProÞ t sharing 26.2 9.8 8.2 27.9
Results indicate that individual variable pay is used more often than group-
based pay. Individual variable pay is most often the result of the performance 
appraisal process. Still, it must be emphasized that performance appraisal does 
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not necessarily result in variable pay, so although companies use this form of 
evaluation, the actual percentage of companies that apply variable pay might be 
lower. However, it must be emphasized that compensation management practices 
in Croatia are highly dependent upon company ownership structure, for example, 
the majority of state-owned companies (11.5% of the total sample) usually do not 
offer variable pay.
A relatively high percentage of companies (57.4%) offer variable pay in the 
form of occasional bonuses based on the supervisor’s (subjective) evaluation. The 
beneÞ cial effect of this form of variable pay will depend upon the criteria used to 
determine variable pay; it will be greatest in case employees are informed about 
the criteria used to award them with such a bonus. Although Croatia is consid-
ered to be a highly collectivistic society, thus employees might more easily accept 
group-based variable pay, research results indicate that it is not a common method 
of variable pay among Croatian companies. Slightly less than 1/3 of all companies 
offer the possibility to earn additional payment based on achieving predetermined 
team results (goal sharing) or as a result of proÞ t-sharing. 
Besides the incidence of variable pay, an important aspect of variable pay is 
the proportion of variable pay in total pay. Research results indicate that variable 
pay among those companies that apply it, on average, amounts to 15.98% of total 
pay, with a standard deviation of 9.10%. However, respondents also provided their 
opinion on the ideal proportion of variable pay in total pay. 
Table 4. 
THE PROPORTION OF VARIABLE PAY IN TOTAL PAY AMONG 
COMPANIES THAT APPLY VARIABLE PAY
The current proportion of variable pay 
(%) among companies that apply variable 
pay (n=44)
 The ideal (desired) proportion of 
variable pay (all companies)
Average 15.98 St. dev. 9.10 Average 26.60 St. dev. 11.94
 
As shown in Table 4, the desired proportion of variable pay is higher than 
the current proportion and amounts to 26.6%. Such results indicate that although 
HR experts Þ nd that it is necessary to implement variable pay there is still a gap 
between perceived employee preferences, current practices, and expectations on 
the ideal proportion of variable pay.
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5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
In the contemporary era, variable pay is the core element of reward manage-
ment practices. Researchers and practitioners have identiÞ ed numerous beneÞ ts 
of variable pay for the employee and the company. However, the overall effect of 
variable pay will depend upon employee attitudes and preferences towards such 
form of compensation. This paper questions the role of variable pay in Croatia – a 
unique research setting due to the long tradition of egalitarianism in compensation 
management in Croatia.
Delphi research revealed that HR experts do not agree that employees in 
Croatia show a high level of acceptance of variable pay. Experts’ opinions di-
verged, as some of them claimed that employees have a positive attitude towards 
variable pay, whilst others claimed that the employees’ attitudes are solely nega-
tive. Some respondents identiÞ ed several preconditions necessary to implement 
variable pay. Taking into consideration such polarized opinions from experts that 
are responsible for implementing compensation systems, it is clear that companies 
cannot implement variable pay without preparing employees for this type of com-
pensation. During this process, both employees and managers should be informed 
and trained on how to use variable pay. For example, it is emphasized that employ-
ees at lower hierarchical levels might accept variable pay with more difÞ culties 
than employees at higher hierarchical levels. However, the level of acceptance will 
be improved in case employees have a higher guaranteed (Þ xed) base pay and in 
case they perceive that the performance appraisal system is fair, and the perfor-
mance rater is competent. In general, concerning the Þ rst research question, it can 
be concluded that employees probably will not show a high preference for variable 
pay but some conditions improve the acceptance of variable pay. 
Quantitative research conducted among medium and large companies con-
Þ rmed that there are still numerous companies that do not use variable compensa-
tion at all. More than 70% of examined companies have implemented performance 
appraisal for at least some employee group within the company, although this does 
not imply that all of them use it as the ground for individual variable pay. For ex-
ample, a relatively high proportion of companies offer occasional bonuses based 
on managers’ subjective evaluations. With such Þ ndings, with respect to the second 
research question, it can be concluded that individual variable pay is the common 
component of compensation packages, at rates that are comparative with other EU 
countries (e.g. Eurofound, 2016). Group-based pay is used at much lower rates, but 
such a trend has been found in other countries as well (e.g. see Eurofound, 2017).
As a part of the Þ nal research question, it was discussed whether employee 
preferences for variable pay and current compensation practices in Croatia con-
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verge. Research results show that although the starting point for the reward sys-
tems in Croatia was somewhat different than in developed EU countries, by now 
these practices have started to converge. However, the question to be answered is 
how will employees accept these practices? Although HR experts did not reach a 
full consensus on the attitudes towards variable pay showed by Croatian employ-
ees, many agree that employees do accept variable pay. As shown earlier, the level 
of acceptance for variable pay is inß uenced by several individual-related factors 
(e.g. risk aversion, trust with managers/co-workers, individual features or value 
system). Still, there are some conditions controlled by the company HRM that also 
improve the acceptance of variable pay, e.g. ratio of Þ xed-variable pay, the fairness 
of the performance appraisal process and rater competence. By solving these is-
sues companies can improve the acceptance of variable pay and minimize the gap 
between employee pay preferences and compensation practices.
Research-based knowledge on attitudes towards variable pay can help human 
resource managers and policymakers to develop more suitable reward systems, 
which in turn has the potential to increase employee performance. There is a gen-
eral scarcity of reward management studies in Croatia and this study intended to 
develop an understanding of the role of variable pay in Croatia. The understanding 
of this issue might enable organizations to adapt their use of variable compensation 
to increase the motivational potential of rewards which in turn leads to positive at-
titudinal and behavioral outcomes and optimizes the use of limited resources.
Some research limitations must be acknowledged. In qualitative research, 
the information on employee preferences for variable pay was based on HR ex-
perts’ experience and thus not provided directly by employees. Besides sample 
size, it was not possible to control the respondent to the questionnaire during the 
quantitative research. Questionnaires were sent to HR managers, so the quality 
of collected data depends upon a single person’s expertise (response bias). The 
research included both joint-stock companies and limited liability companies so 
some forms of compensation (e.g. equity-based remuneration) are more often ap-
plicable by public limited companies. The research included only medium and 
large-sized companies thus research results might not be representative of reward 
practices in small companies.
In terms of recommendations for practitioners, it must be emphasized that un-
like in other countries where variable compensation will be broadly accepted by em-
ployees, companies operating in Croatia must be aware that some employees might 
have a negative attitude towards variable pay. This might be especially the case with 
individual variable pay, due to tradition, reward management heritage and dominant 
work values. Still, incentive pay has become a common component of compensation 
packages and the level of acceptance of variable compensation can be controlled/
improved through appropriate preparations and other HRM practices. 
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PERSPEKTIVE PRIMJENE VARIJABILNOG NAGRA IVANJA U HRVATSKOJ: 
POSTOJI LI JAZ IZME U O EKIVANJA ZAPOSLENIKA I STVARNOG STANJA?
Summary
Varijabilno nagra ivanje omogu ava brojne prednosti za zaposlenike i poslodavce, me u-
tim, krajnji u inak ovog sustava nagra ivanja ovisi o stavovima i preferencijama zaposlenika 
prema takvom na inu nagra ivanja. Uzimaju i u obzir injenicu da su se sustavi nagra ivanja 
u Hrvatskoj tradicionalno temeljili na principu jednakosti pla a, cilj ovog rada je istražiti ulogu 
varijabilnog nagra ivanja iz perspektive zaposlenika i poslodavaca. Provedeno je Delphi istra-
živanje o stavovima zaposlenika prema varijabilnom nagra ivanju te kvantitativno istraživanje 
praksi varijabilnog nagra ivanja. Nalazi Delphi istraživanja ukazuju na izostanak konsenzusa 
o preferencija zaposlenika u pogledu varijabilnog nagra ivanja u Hrvatskoj. Istraživanje praksi 
nagra ivanja u hrvatskim poduze ima pokazalo je da je neki oblik individualnog varijabilnog 
nagra ivanja primijenjen kod ve ine istraživanih poduze a. Utvr en je mogu i jaz izme u prefe-
rencija zaposlenika prema varijabilnom nagra ivanju i stvarnih praksi nagra ivanja te se stoga u 
radu identiÞ ciraju preduvjeti za uspješnu primjenu varijabilnog nagra ivanja. 
Klju ne rije i: pla a, varijabilno nagra ivanje, preferencije u nagra ivanju
